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Introduction 
Background Information 
One of the earliest documents describing Illinois’ drainage law, titled “Engineering and Legal 
Aspects of Land Drainage in Illinois” published by the Illinois State Geological Survey 
(Pickels and Leonard, 1921). The purpose of that report was, in part “to lay before the 
legislature as clear a statement as possible of what the present drainage law of Illinois is; to 
suggest defects particularly in the present statute laws; and to suggest certain legislative 
improvements.” 
In 1950 and 1956 the University of Illinois College of Agriculture Extension Service pub-
lished a pair of documents titled “Illinois Farm Drainage Law” (Hannah, 1950; Hannah, 
1956). These documents provided background on Illinois drainage law, although their pri-
mary focus was for farm owners and commissioners of drainage districts. The 1956 manual 
reflects changes from a new drainage code adopted by Illinois in 1955. 
In 1965 the University of Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station and Engineering 
Experiment Station published a report titled “Highway and Agricultural Drainage Practices” 
in cooperation with the State of Illinois Division of Highways and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Public Roads (Drablos and Jones, 1965). The purpose of that docu-
ment was to describe “the resumé of the practices followed by highway authorities and others 
together with the compilation of the drainage laws,” which could then  
“provide highway and agricultural administrators with an important tool to assist in the 
establishment of sound drainage policies.” 
In 1986 the Agricultural Research Station at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, in cooperation with the Illinois Department of Transportation and the Federal 
Highway Administration, produced a document titled “Illinois Drainage Laws: Rights and 
Responsibilities of Highway Authorities and Landowners Adjacent to Highways” 
(Uchtmann et al., 1986). This document, referred to herein as the 1986 manual, was in-
tended “to provide an extensive treatment of Illinois drainage law as it applies to local, 
county, and state highway authorities and adjacent landowners in both agricultural and 
urban environments.” Uchtmann et al. (1986) examined both common law (court decisions) 
and statutory law at the state and federal levels. It also examined administrative regulations 
affecting drainage. The 1986 manual was developed under a cooperative agreement between 
the Illinois Cooperative Highway Research Program and the Agricultural Experiment Station 
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. As such, the 1986 manual emphasized 
drainage disputes that may arise in construction, maintenance, and improvement of road-
ways and the drainage of adjacent lands.  
In 1997 the University of Illinois Cooperative Extension Service published a document titled 
“Illinois Drainage Law” referred to herein as the 1997 manual (Uchtmann and Gehris, 
1997). The purpose of the 1997 manual was “to inform landowners, drainage district 
Note to readers: Words or terms  in a red box are linked to definitions in the glossary. 
To see the definition, please click on the boxed word or term.  To return to your reading 
location, hold down the ALT button on your keyboard and press the left arrow key.
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commissioners, land improvement contractors, and other interested people of general legal 
principles related to drainage and the construction of drainage improvements.” The primary 
emphases of the 1997 manual were on drainage districts, on the impact of the wetlands pro-
visions of the Food Security Act of 1985 on farm drainage activities, and impacts of wetlands 
provisions in Section 404 of the Clean Water Act on permits for construction and fill in wet-
lands. 
The 1986 and 1997 manuals provide an excellent review and summary of Illinois’ drainage 
laws at the times of their publication. The earlier publications (Pickels and Leonard, 1921; 
Hannah, 1956; Drablos and Jones, 1965), while providing interesting and useful back-
ground on Illinois’ drainage law, are superseded and summarized by the information in 
drainage manuals published in 1986 and 1997 and hence are not quoted extensively in this 
document. 
The intent of this document is not to replace the earlier manuals but rather to augment them 
by describing public acts and court precedents from the period since the earlier manuals were 
published. At the same time, this document needs to provide sufficient background on 
Illinois’ drainage law prior to 1986 and 1997 to allow this to serve as a stand-alone reference 
for highway authorities and adjacent landowners related to drainage issues. Therefore, this 
document will quote extensively from the earlier manuals (Uchtmann et al., 1986; 
Uchtmann and Gehris, 1997) to provide a clear description of current Illinois drainage law. 
Purpose and Scope of This Document 
The purpose of this document is to inform landowners, highway authorities, and other inter-
ested parties about general legal principles related to drainage and drainage improvements. 
This may allow them to recognize situations where their legal rights have been compromised 
or where their actions may jeopardize the legal rights of others. However, a licensed attorney 
with expertise in drainage law should be consulted in any situation where legal rights may be 
affected. The scope of this document is generally limited to Illinois common and statutory 
drainage law. Some federal laws are discussed where they have a significant impact on drain-
age issues in Illinois. Likewise, a small number of case precedents from outside of Illinois are 
discussed where they may have an impact on drainage issues in Illinois. The scope of this 
document also is generally limited to drainage topics that are related in some manner to 
highway drainage, those that may impact highway drainage or design, or that fall under the 
regulatory umbrella of the Illinois Department of Transportation.  
Illinois Laws on Drainage 
Surface-water drainage law in the United States generally can be described in three 
categories: the Common Enemy rule, the Law of Natural Drainage (sometimes referred to as 
the Civil Law rule), and the Reasonable Use rule. Illinois drainage law is based on the Law of 
Natural Drainage but has been modified to consider Reasonable Use as described below. The 
following is an overview of the three historical drainage-law categories.  
3 
Under the Common Enemy rule, landowners can treat surface waters as a common enemy, 
and each landowner has the right to protect against surface water without liability for injury 
to adjoining properties. Similarly, adjoining landowners have the right to take defensive 
actions against water flowing onto their lands. In 1940, 21 states and the District of 
Columbia employed the Common Enemy rule1, whereas by 1990 only 13 states2 continued to 
employ the Common Enemy doctrine and two (Alabama and Kansas) retain it in urban drain-
age disputes (Cole, 1989). 
The Law of Natural Drainage (Civil Law rule) dictates that the “natural flow” of the water is 
controlling. The servient or lower landowner generally must accept what water comes to it 
and cannot alter the flow away from the dominant or higher landowner. The dominant land-
owner has a natural easement to allow surface water to flow naturally onto the servient land, 
however, he does not have an unlimited right to increase the rate or amount of surface-water 
runoff flowing onto the land of the servient landowner. The Law of Natural Drainage is 
often quoted from Gormley v. Sanford (1869): 
As water must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be established where land is 
held under the artificial titles created by human law, there can clearly be no other 
rule at once so equitable and so easy of application as that which enforces natural 
laws. There is no surprise or hardship in this, for each successive owner takes with 
whatever advantages or inconveniences nature has stamped upon his land. 
Cole (1989) listed 14 states3 that “exclusively employ some form of the natural flow theory.” 
This list includes Illinois; however, as discussed below, Illinois drainage law now incorporates 
aspects of the Reasonable Use rule. Cole (1989) also lists three other states (Alabama, Kansas, 
and South Dakota) that “employ the natural flow theory to resolve drainage disputes in rural 
areas.” 
The Reasonable Use rule is a modification of the Civil Law rule where the reasonableness  
of the parties’ conduct is determined considering factors such as the gravity and foreseeability 
of the harm, the motive, and utility of the actor’s conduct. When both parties’ actions are 
reasonable, the liability falls on the party that altered the natural flow. In 1940 only 
Minnesota and New Hampshire employed the Reasonable Use rule. Cole (1989) lists 16  
                                                 
1 States following Common Enemy rule in 1940: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
2 States following Common Enemy rule in 1990: Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and the District 
of Columbia.  
3 States following Law of Natural Drainage in 1990: Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West 
Virginia. 
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Underlying Principle: The Law of Natural Drainage 
Introduction and Scope  
The basic principle guiding drainage law in Illinois is referred to as the Law of Natural 
Drainage. This principle was given by Uchtmann et al. (1986) as: 
Landowners, including highway authorities, have a right to drain water away as it 
would in a state of nature. Lower landowners, including highway authorities, have a 
responsibility to accept water flowing naturally onto or through their lands and have 
no right to interfere with such natural drainage. 
The Basic Principle of Natural Drainage  
The Law of Natural Drainage recognizes natural differences in levels of lands. The basic 
principle is that landowners have the right to take whatever advantages or the responsibility 
to accept whatever inconveniences of drainage that nature places upon their land. These 
advantages or inconveniences depend on the elevation of one’s property in relation to the 
land around it.  
The principles of natural drainage apply when one piece of land is at a higher elevation than 
the adjoining land, allowing water to flow from the higher (dominant) to the lower (servient) 
estate. One of the most important principles of Illinois drainage law is that the owners of the 
lower ground are bound to receive surface water that naturally flows onto it from higher 
ground. The right of the dominant estate owner to drain on and over the servient estate is 
based on the principle that nature has ordained such drainage. According to Farnham 
(1904),  
Thus, he who has the upper grounds cannot change the course of the waters, either by 
turning it some other way, or rendering it more rapid, or making any other change 
in it to the prejudice of the owner of the lower grounds. Neither can he who has the 
lower estate do anything that may hinder his grounds from receiving the water which 
they ought to receive, and that in the manner which has been regulated. 
The idea of natural flows means that the owner of dominant land could not construct 
channels or drains that divert the flow of water from one watershed to another or deposit the 
water onto servient land that in the natural course of drainage had not previously received 
that water (Anderson v. Henderson, 1888; Young v. Commissioners of Highways, 1890; Graham 
v. Keene, 1892). Furthermore, the owner of dominant land was not permitted to collect 
waters that in the natural course of drainage would flow through several channels onto 
servient land into a single channel (Daum v. Cooper, 1904). Additionally, the owner of 
servient land is not permitted to erect structures such as dams, levees, or embankments on 
his or her land that would prevent or deter the natural flow of water from the dominant to 
servient land (Bradbury v. Vandalia Levy and Drainage District, 1908; Town of Bois D’Arc v. 
Condery, 1912; Deterding v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 1924; Gough v. Goble, 1954; 
Geis v. Rohrer, 1957). 
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Reasonable Use Limitation (Land Development) 
Each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though 
the flow of surface water is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but liabil-
ity is incurred when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is 
unreasonable and causes substantial damage. …Reasonableness is a question of fact 
to be determined in each case by weighing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff 
against the utility of the conduct of the defendant. (Pendergrast v. Aiken, 1977) 
In 1974 the Illinois Supreme Court expanded the policy of reasonable use to non-
agricultural drainage. In Templeton v. Huss (1974) the servient estate sued the dominant 
estate for land development that allegedly increased the water flow from the upper land to 
the lower in an unreasonable manner. In this case the Illinois Supreme Court held that a 
policy of reasonable use is to be applied to the issue of the liability of the owner of higher 
land for injury to property caused by the increased flow of surface water onto lower land 
when the upper owner has interfered with the natural drainage pattern of surface waters 
through construction of a residential subdivision. Prior to Templeton v. Huss (1974), most 
drainage cases in Illinois involved water draining across the ground surface  Templeton v. 
Huss (1974) is the first time the court considered interference with natural seepage as the 
basis for liability for increasing the amount of water drained. The Supreme Court found that 
just as the Good Husbandry Exception prevented unreasonable agricultural development, so 
also prevented was substantial alteration of natural drainage by “surface and subsurface 
changes, which interfere with the natural seepage of water into the soil of the dominant 
estate.” In their decision, the Supreme Court stated: 
The question which must be confronted is whether the increased flow of surface 
waters from the land of the defendants to that of the plaintiff, regardless of whether it 
was caused by diversion from another watershed, the installation of septic tanks, the 
grading and paving of streets, or the construction of houses, basements and appurte-
nances, was beyond a range consistent with the policy of reasonableness of use which 
led initially to the good-husbandry exception. (Templeton v. Huss, 1974) 
Fry and Fry (1975) state that “in concluding Huss, the Supreme Court stated, regardless 
whether the increased flow was caused by septic tank installation, paving, home construction, 
or diversion from another watershed, the issue of liability depended on whether the conduct 
was reasonable.” By including diversion from another watershed in this list, the court 
“declared a reasonable use rule applicable to urban development which interferes with 
natural seepage or which diverts the natural course of drainage” (Fry and Fry, 1975). 
Uchtmann et al. (1986) discuss that while Templeton v. Huss (1974) established the 
Reasonable Use Limitation, the court’s meaning was not clear and that no test of 
“reasonableness” was defined. Hence, at the time of the 1986 drainage manual, the implica-
tions of Templeton v. Huss (1974) were still evolving through the courts and regulations 
governing storm drainage system and detention design. In Callahan v. Rickey (1981), the 
court decision shows that good husbandry criteria still apply to agricultural settings post-
Templeton v. Huss, implying that the owner of a dominant estate may still have a virtually 
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unlimited right to increase the drainage from agricultural land. Callahan v. Rickey (1981) 
also clearly demonstrates that the owner of the servient estate has the burden of proving acts 
were inconsistent with reasonable use. However, the following year the same appellate court 
district in Starcevich v. City of Farmington (1982) dictated that trial courts should consider 
limitations on reasonable use by ruling that the plaintiff stated a sufficient claim, which 
alleged the defendant had a duty not to make a change resulting in an “unreasonable use.” 
The court found “that the ‘unreasonableness’ to be pleaded and proved is not in the 
defendant’s use of the dominant estate, but rather in the interference with drainage through 
natural flow and seepage that defendant’s changes cause upon the plaintiff’s servient estate.” 
The court stated that “Plaintiff clearly alleges defendant’s duty not to unreasonably increase 
the quantity and force of waters cast upon his land” and “specific changes made on the 
dominant estate which he alleges constitute breaches of that duty.” Hence the court found 
that interference with natural flow and seepage that interferes with drainage onto a servient 
estate may constitute an unreasonable use. 
A significant case subsequent to the 1986 drainage manual is found in Bollweg v. Richard 
Marker Associates, Inc. (2004). In 2001, defendant purchased 129 acres of land north of 12 
acres owned by the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s land was located between defendant’s land and the 
Fox River. Defendant’s land was annexed into the City of Yorkville and planned for develop-
ment of 262 homes. Prior to defendant’s development, approximately 60 acres drained 
across plaintiff’s land. During development, most of field tiles in defendant’s land were 
destroyed and detention ponds were built to store water and release it at controlled rate to 
plaintiff’s land. Subsequent to development, approximately 80 acres drained to plaintiff’s 
land. The defendant argued that they used sound engineering practices and complied with 
Yorkville’s stormwater ordinance. The plaintiff showed that the volume discharged increased 
by a minimum of 12%. Importantly, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument, 
stating that this was an issue of state law as opposed to local government rules (Kinnally, 
2005). This finding is significant for drainage of transportation systems and land develop-
ment because an approved stormwater drainage system that complies with stormwater 
management policy or ordinance may still be found in violation of reasonable use limita-
tions. Furthermore, in Bollweg v. Richard Marker Associates, Inc. (2004), the court stated that 
“the potential for economic loss resulting from an increase in the flow of water onto the 
servient estate should not be disregarded. … Likewise, the potential benefits resulting from 
developing real estate in a dominant position should not be ignored. Consequently, the 
benefit to the dominant estate should be balanced against the harm caused to the servient 
estate.”  
In addition, in Bollweg v. Richard Marker Associates, Inc. (2004) the court reiterated that 
pursuant to the “good husbandry” exception, the owner of a dominant estate may increase or 
alter the flow of water upon a servient estate if it is required for the proper husbandry or 
reasonable development of the dominant estate. Even with this exception, the dominant 
estate’s right to increase the rate or amount of runoff onto the servient estate is not 
unlimited.  
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The court upheld the trial court’s decision to issue an injunction 
preventing the defendant from:  
1. continuing the development until it removes the unnatural accumulations of
water or otherwise redesigns the storm water management system to prevent
such an unnatural accumulation;
2. using the preexisting agricultural drainage tile as a discharge outlet for the
southeast basin;
3. draining the southeast basin through any unnatural method, including
restrictor pipes, that would change the predevelopment flow of water across
plaintiff’s property; and
4. from causing unnaturally accumulating water from the southwest basin to
flow across plaintiff’s property.
Another recent case impacting non-agricultural drainage is Shulte v. Flowers (2013). In that 
case the defendant altered a 4.5-acre plot by removing some soil, compacting the remaining 
soil, and placing gravel to replace the removed soil. A 48- by 52-foot area was raised 1 foot 
and a building erected on that area. Defendant also widened and deepened a ditch on his 
property to increase water retention. The plaintiff owned the lowest parcel in the neighbor-
hood (servient to all other parcels) and has “always been subject to flooding because all other 
parcels drain to it.” Plaintiff claimed that “after defendant’s alteration of his land, the flood-
ing became considerably worse.” Evidence showed three additional factors that might have 
contributed to increased flooding: 
1. greater than average rainfall for the three years preceding the trial;
2. other nearby properties also contributed to flooding;
3. a partial obstruction of the storm sewer pipe along southern boundary of plaintiff’s
property.
The court found in favor of the defendants, stating that “Plaintiffs had the burden of proving 
that defendant’s development of his land was unreasonable in the burdens it placed on plain-
tiffs’ land … and a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that plaintiffs failed to carry that 
burden.” Hence, while the principle that the owner of higher ground incurs liability for 
damages caused to the lower ground by an increase in the flow of surface water, to date the 
burden on liability is directly tied to an unreasonable development of the higher ground. 
In Dovin v. Winfield Township (1987) the court stated, “Consequently … we conclude that 
the appropriate method of determining whether there is a compensable injury due to an in-
creased flow of water is to determine whether such increased flow is reasonable by balancing 
the benefit to the dominant estate against the harm done to the servient estate.” 
In summary, the Reasonable Use Limitation says that a landowner is legally privileged to make 
a reasonable use of his or her land, even though the resulting alteration of the flow of surface 
water may cause some harm to others. The landowner is liable for the harm to the extent 
that t
provi
wheth
consi
Ease
An ea
use or
the ot
land. 
prescr
things
of acc
repair
Natu
natur
that a
Natu
can b
deed 
Certa
(e.g., 
age d
obtain
exerci
When
demn
must 
owne
referr
even 
itself 
groun
face w
tive u
drain
lower
acqui
maint
For a 
1
he harm is ti
ng that the la
er the devel
ders both the
ments  
sement is an 
 control the o
her’s general 
Drainage eas
iption. Who
 as are necess
ess to make t
s. 
ral easement
al channels a
re addressed
ral Drainage.
e obtained b
between land
in governme
highway aut
istricts, mun
 easements 
se of eminen
 such rights
ed, just com
be paid. A p
r and fails to
ed to as “pre
though that 
become a rig
d fails to tak
ater, the low
se. … Likew
on his or he
 ground for 
re the right t
ain other art
prescriptive 
. adverse; 
ed to an unr
nd developm
opment was 
 benefit to t
interest in lan
ther’s land, o
property righ
ements can b
ever has an ea
ary to preserv
he necessary 
s are the 
nd drainage 
 in the Law o
 Easements 
y agreement 
owners. 
nt authoritie
horities, drai
icipalities) ca
through the 
t domain. 
 are con-
pensation 
rescriptive ea
 enforce his 
scriptive by 
right is not e
ht. Uchtman
e action whe
er landowne
ise, the own
r land from h
the prescript
o change the
ificial condi
easement to 
easonable de
ent was un
reasonable is
he dominant
d owned by 
r an area abo
ts; for examp
e created by n
sement in or
e the easeme
f 
or 
s 
n-
n 
sement is ac
or her rights 
use easement
xpressed in a
n et al. (198
n the owner
r may acqui
er of lower la
igher groun
ive period. B
 place where
tions not per
arise, the use
11 
velopment o
reasonable fa
 a factual an
 estate and t
another pers
ve or below 
le, the right 
ature, by ag
 over another
nt; that is, he
quired when
for a prescri
s” and allow
 grant. In su
6) state, “Fo
 of lower lan
re an easeme
nd may acq
d when the w
y this same p
 his or her su
mitted unde
 must gener
f the higher 
lls on the pl
alysis done o
he harm to t
on that allow
it, for special
to have water
reement, by c
’s land has th
 may keep it
 a landowne
bed period. T
 the continu
ch a case, th
r example, i
d dams or o
nt to mainta
uire a right t
ater has be
rocess, the h
rface water 
r the rules o
ally have bee
land. The b
aintiff. Deter
n a case-by-
he servient e
s the easemen
 purposes con
 flow across a
ondemnatio
e right to do
 in repair and
r is harmed 
hese are som
ation of a pr
e harmful pr
f an owner o
bstructs the 
in the dam 
o have no su
en diverted f
igher lando
enters lower
f natural dra
n: 
urden of 
mining 
case basis tha
state. 
t owner to 
sistent with 
 neighbor’s 
n, or by 
 all such 
 has the righ
by another 
etimes 
e-existing us
actice may 
f higher 
flow of sur-
by prescrip-
rface water 
rom the 
wner may 
 ground or to
inage.” 
t 
t 
e 
 
12 
2. uninterrupted for a period of at least 20 years, or when land is used as a public
highway, 15 years;
3. exclusive;
4. continuous; and
5. under a claim of right.
Acquisition of such a right is a factual one, not easily determined. The scope of a prescriptive 
easement is limited to the dominant landowner’s use of the property. Included within the 
scope of the easement are those actions necessary to protect that use. For example, it has been 
held that a drainage ditch essential to make a highway easement effective is included within a 
prescriptive highway easement, provided it is maintained and is used by the public.  
Uchtmann et al. (1986) point out that prescriptive easements may extend beyond the 
original parties that created them. As an example, Uchtmann et al. (1986) cite Broadwell 
Special Drainage District v. Lawrence (1907), in which the owner of a dominant estate 
diverted water from its natural course by constructing an artificial channel. Water flowed 
through it continuously for more than 20 years. The court held that other proprietors who 
benefited thereby had an easement by prescription in the new watercourse and that the water 
could not be restored to its original course. This rule applies even though the affected 
landowners are not contiguous. 
A significant case involving drainage easements and highway drainage is Hahn v. County of 
Kane (2012). In 2005 Hahn entered into a sales agreement with Kane County for the follow-
ing: “(1) a strip of land in fee simple for purposes of widening and improving Randall Road; 
(2) an exclusive and permanent easement on approximately 3.2 acres of property at the north 
end of the Hahn property for “storm water drainage, retention, detention and conveyance, 
and all things appurtenant thereto.” In 2006 the county entered into an intergovernmental 
agreement with the City of St. Charles for road improvements that required the county to 
expand stormwater detention on the Hahn property “if adjacent development desires to 
manage stormwater with a facility at the location of the afore described stormwater manage-
ment facility.” In May 2010 the county issued permits to expand stormwater detention, and 
the city issued permits for private development that would utilize additional stormwater 
capacity. The appellate court found that “[t]he owner of an easement cannot make a material 
alteration to the character of the easement if the alteration would place a greater burden on 
the servient estate or would interfere with the use and enjoyment of the servient estate.” 
Further, the court found “an easement may not be extended by the owner of the dominant 
estate to accommodate other lands for which the easement was not originally intended. Beloit 
Foundry Co., 28 Ill.2d at 388, 192 N.E.2d 384; McCann, 242 Ill.App.3d at 255, 182 Ill. 
Dec. 542, 609 N.E.2d 1076. Clearly, the grant of an easement does not contemplate an 
open invitation to ‘adjacent development’ to divert stormwater onto the easement property. 
No one but an owner of land can create an easement over it. … However, even a dominant 
estate is not free to invite whomever it wishes to join in the use of an easement just because 
there is room to do so.” While the county had an easement to construct stormwater 
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detention on Hahn’s property, extending it by intergovernmental agreement to the City of 
St. Charles and subsequently to provide stormwater detention for a nearby developer was 
outside the agreement that created the original easement and therefore was not legal. 
A recent (March 2014) U.S. Supreme Court decision of significance to transportation and 
easements, although not directly related to drainage, is Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. 
United States. In an 8–1 decision, the court decided that the government did not retain a 
right-of-way across private land based on a now-abandoned railroad easement. In the case in 
question, when giving title to the land in 1976, the patent for the land was granted “subject 
to those rights for railroad purposes as have been granted to the Laramie Hahn’s Peak and 
Pacific Railway Company and its successors or assigns.” The railway went through several 
changes of ownership, ending in 1996, when the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad notified 
the Surface Transportation Board of its intent to abandon the right-of-way. After receiving 
approval, abandonment was completed in 2004. In 2006 the U.S. government initiated 
action to quiet title of the right-of-way to the United States. In the opinion of the court, 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
An easement is a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another 
and the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement. … 
easements may be unilaterally terminated by abandonment, leaving the servient 
owner with a possessory estate unencumbered by the servitude. … In other words, if 
the beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears and the land-
owner resumes his full and unencumbered interest in the land. …Now the 
Government argues that such a right of way is tantamount to a limited fee with an 
implied revisionary interest. We decline to endorse such a stark change in position, 
especially given ‘the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are 
concerned.’  
Hodges’ (2014) commentary on this case cites both the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1922 warning in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon “that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” 
The Pennsylvania Coal case upholds the certainty and predictability of land titles and 
upholds that the government must pay just compensation when taking private land. 
Maintenance of Natural Drains Across Servient Lands  
Owners of servient estates may not intentionally obstruct watercourses flowing across 
their lands, but they have no duty to keep them clear of naturally occurring brush, 
silt, or debris. Owners of dominant estates, because of their drainage easements, have 
rights to go upon the servient estates and make repairs as long as they do not cause 
unnecessary injury to the servient estate. Access permits are required before doing any 
work on a highway right-of-way. (Uchtmann et al., 1986) 
Therefore, in Illinois, the owner of a drainage easement has the right to keep it in repair. 
This right generally places no obligation on the owner of the servient land through which the 
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easement passes to make such repairs or maintain the drainage. The owner of the easement 
has the right to enter the servient estate to keep the drain in repair, provided the repair can 
be accomplished without unnecessary injury to the land. The Illinois Supreme Court has 
stated that:  
As a general proposition, whoever has an easement in or over another’s land has the 
right to do all such things as are necessary to preserve the easement; that is, he may 
keep it in repair and has the right of access to make the necessary repairs. … It would 
seem, therefore, that the common law annexes to the easement of a drain in another’s 
land the right to go upon such land and clean out or repair such drain without doing 
unnecessary injury to the land. (Wessels v. Colebank, 1898)  
Uchtmann et al. (1986) discuss the rights of owners to maintain easements, including those 
across highway rights-of-way, saying: 
The court has further mentioned that such an interpretation is consistent with 
fundamental concepts respecting property rights: property owners themselves are ex-
pected to protect those rights, while others are expected not to invade them (Savoie v. 
Town of Bourbonnais, 1950). This rule applies to all drainage easements, whether 
created by nature, by agreement, by condemnation, or by prescription.  
This right of self-help probably does not extend to owners of dominant estates who 
have drainage easements across highway rights-of-way, because it will be difficult for 
these persons to make repairs in the right-of-way without endangering public use of 
the highway. However, highway authorities will issue permits in many instances to 
allow private landowners to work in the highway right-of-way, for instance to repair 
cross-drainage structures. 
Mutual Drain  
Section 2-10 of the Illinois Drainage Code (70 ILCS 605/2-10) addresses drains and levees 
for the mutual benefit of the members of the drainage system. The code protects the rights of 
drainage between adjoining land holders and also protects drains continuous in their charac-
ter and purpose for the mutual benefit of the land affected whether they had been con-
structed by license or consent. “Drains and levees deemed to be for the mutual benefit of the 
lands connected or protected shall constitute a perpetual easement on such lands and shall 
not be filled, obstructed, breached or impaired in any way without the consent of the owners 
of all such lands.”  
In Bollweg v. Richard Marker Associates, Inc. (2004), defendant claimed the right to enter 
plaintiff’s land to maintain a tile that was constructed as part of a mutual drain. However, in 
development of his land, defendant destroyed most of the tiles on his land connecting to the 
tile that he wished to maintain. The court found that: 
having changed the character of the easement, defendant cannot now claim an 
easement pursuant to the Code. An easement once definitely settled and located can-
not be changed by either party without the consent of the other where the change 
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results in a substitution of a servitude different from that which existed previously. By 
removing the tiles and converting the downstream tile into the outlet for a 
stormwater detention pond, the defendant materially altered the character of the 
easement. 
The court found that the defendant’s connection to the tile was not illegal but that the 
defendant no longer had an easement. In considering the legality, the court cited Callahan v. 
Rickey (1981), stating, “[t]he owner of a dominant estate does not have an unlimited right to 
increase the rate or amount of surface-water runoff flowing onto the land of a servient 
estate.”  
Highway Drainage 
A highway authority is subject to the natural drainage law. Through the power of 
eminent domain, however, a highway authority may modify its natural drainage 
rights. In addition, a highway authority may contract with landowners to alter its 
drainage obligations. The highway code makes it illegal to obstruct or injure a high-
way and requires a permit to do any work in a right-of-way. In general, a highway 
authority is liable for maintenance and repair of ditches in a right-of-way that bene-
fits the highway. (Uchtmann et al., 1986) 
The interaction of the drainage features of highways with those of the adjoining lands that 
they cross is governed by the same rules applying to private land. Generally, a landowner 
may obtain an easement to drain his or her land outside of the course of natural drainage by 
deed or prescription only. However, by statute (Illinois Highway Code 605 ILCS 5, Section 
4-502, 5-802, 6-802), highway authorities also may obtain drainage rights through the use of 
eminent domain. 
Uchtmann et al. (1986) point out that the wording of the statute leads to the interpretation, 
“that the statutory method of acquiring the land must be preceded by an offer of just 
compensation to the owner and his or her refusal to accept that offer.” Uchtmann et al. 
(1986) further point out that the question of necessity is determined by the highway authori-
ties acting in their official capacity and is beyond the control and jurisdiction of the courts. 
Additionally, the statutory provision is in no way limited by the natural flow of water. The 
court has expressly stated that the provision is intended to enable highway authorities to con-
vey water from the highway in a direction other than its natural course. Therefore, a highway 
authority can divert water as long as it has acquired the necessary easements from affected 
parties.  
Section 9-107 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9-107) states that “[w]henever the 
highway authorities are about to lay a tile drain along any public highway the highway 
authorities may contract with the owners or occupants of adjoining lands to lay larger tile 
than would be necessary to drain the highway, and permit connection therewith by such 
contracting parties to drain their lands.” Christopher (2002) points out that “[t]his section 
only covers voluntary cooperative arrangements between highway authorities and their 
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neighbors. It does not create any obligation for a highway authority to contract with adjacent 
owners and does not obligate the highway authority to maintain all tiles which cross or run 
parallel to the highway right of way. It also does not create any obligation for the highway 
authority to maintain tiles off the highway right of way which do not benefit the highway.” 
Section 9-113 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/) provides that construction of 
ditches or drains along a highway by any “public utility company, municipal corporation, or 
other public or private corporation, association, or person” may be undertaken only after first 
obtaining the written consent of the appropriate highway authority. Construction of drain-
age facilities by parties other than the highway authority that do not benefit the highway are 
outside the scope of the highway authority’s highway easement across the land of others. In 
Benno v. Central Lake County Joint Action Water Agency, (1993) the appellate court found 
that an easement that belongs to DOT for highway purposes “may not be extended to 
accommodate other uses.” While it is likely that government entities, such as drainage dis-
tricts or municipalities, which the legislature has vested with the power of eminent domain, 
could use Section 9-113 to construct a ditch in a highway easement, an individual landowner 
wishing to drain his or her own land may be prohibited from using the highway easement to 
do so. In cases where the highway authority has granted a landowner permission to construct 
a ditch along a highway, the courts have held that permission for a private individual to dig a 
ditch along the highway is not a grant of a perpetual right for the individual to drain his or 
her land through this ditch because the authorities cannot grant away the use of the right-of-
way of the public highway to a private person. Similarly, as was discussed earlier regarding 
the case of Hahn v. Kane County (2012), because the highway authorities own only an ease-
ment in the highway land, and the fee remains in the adjoining owner, highway authorities 
have no right to grant abutting landowners the privilege of digging a ditch along the highway 
fronting the property of another landowner: it would impose an additional burden and servi-
tude on such land that is inconsistent with the limited rights of the public in the highway. 
Uchtmann et al. (1986) state “that without the power of eminent domain, a party can only 
construct an open ditch along a highway by securing the permission of all contiguous 
landowners whose property is affected by the construction.”  
Section 9-101.1 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9-101.1) provides in part as 
follows: 
Whenever the proper highway authority is about to construct or improve the drainage 
structures of a State highway … the highway authority shall meet and consult with 
the authorities of any municipality adjacent to or through which such highway or 
road runs. The purpose of such meetings is to work out an agreement with such 
municipality and all other interested agencies and units of local government as to the 
extent of such drainage construction or improvement. 
Christopher (2002) states that “[t]he key words here are meet, consult, and agree. This 
means that neither side tells the other what to do. Both sides need to do what it takes to 
come to an agreement.” 
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Maintenance and Repair of Highway Drainage 
While the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/) imposes on the highway authorities the duty 
to “construct, maintain, and repair the highways” within their jurisdiction, drainage systems 
are not expressly listed. In instances when adjoining owners have connected a drain to an 
existing highway drain or ditch under Section 9-107, the highway is still benefited by it. 
Thus it is likely the highway authority will be responsible for the maintenance costs. 
However, when a landowner retains the fee, obtains a permit, and constructs a ditch in the 
highway right-of-way for a private purpose, where the highway is not benefited by such a 
drain, the highway authority has no responsibility to maintain and repair the drain.  
Section 9-111.1 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9-111.1) requires that “[t]he 
highway authorities shall from time to time inspect the bridges and culverts on the public 
highways and streets under their respective jurisdictions which span streams and watercourses 
and shall remove driftwood and other materials accumulated within the right of way at such 
structures which obstruct the free flow of either low or high water.”  
Section 9-115.1 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9-115.1) states that “[i]t is 
unlawful for any person to construct or cause to be constructed any drainage facility for the 
purpose of the detention or retention of water within a distance of 10 feet plus one and one-
half times the depth of any drainage facility adjacent to the right-of-way of any public high-
way without the written permission of the highway authority having jurisdiction over the 
public highway.” Section 9-115.1 also states, “It is unlawful for any person to construct or 
cause to be constructed any earthen berm such that the toe of such berm will be nearer than 
10 feet to the right-of-way of any public highway without the written permission of the 
highway authority having jurisdiction over the public highway.” Christopher (2002) states, 
“This provision was inserted to prevent the construction of detention ponds and other drain-
age facilities at the edge of the right of way. These facilities can make future widening of the 
highway much more problematic.” 
Section 9-117 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9-117.1) states:  
If any person injures or obstructs a public highway by … plowing or digging any 
ditch or other opening thereon, or by turning a current of water so as to saturate, 
wash or damage the same, or by plowing in or across or on the slopes of the side 
gutters or ditches, or by placing any material in such ditches, or in any way 
interfering with the free flow of water therein, … without the permission of the high-
way authority having jurisdiction over such highway, he shall be guilty of a petty 
offense. … However, this section shall not apply to any person who … through or 
along whose land a public highway may pass, who shall desire to drain his land, and 
who shall give due notice to the proper highway authority of such intention, and who 
shall first secure from such highway authority written permission for any work, 
ditching or excavating he proposes to do within the limits of the highway. 
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adequate bridges or culverts over natural drains or over ditches constructed in the 
course of natural drainage. 
According to the Illinois Drainage Code (70 ILCS 605/), highway authorities generally must 
construct and maintain bridges whenever a natural drain or ditch constructed in the original 
natural drainage crosses a public highway. If a drainage district has removed or destroyed a 
highway bridge this statute suggests that the drainage district is responsible for restoring the 
bridge when it has made such construction necessary. This code requires the highway 
authority to anticipate drainage needs in a particular area “for all time” and to construct its 
bridges or culverts of sufficient capacity to accommodate such increased drainage within a 
basin. The case of Kankakee & Seneca R.R. Co. v. Horan (1890) involved a railroad that con-
structed a culvert of insufficient size. The court decided that in building a culvert, the rail-
road was bound to anticipate and provide for any legal increase in the flows. As Uchtmann et 
al. (1986) state, “It is also logical to require a highway authority to design a bridge to 
accommodate future volumes of flow and at the same time to require the drainage district to 
protect the abutments and other supporting structures. … Perhaps it is a reasonable compro-
mise to compel the highway authority to design the bridges and culverts for adequate 
quantity and to require the drainage district to protect the supporting members if they 
decide to alter the flow line.” 
In urban areas, the issue of liability for costs of construction and maintenance focuses 
upon municipal corporations instead of drainage districts exercising storm drainage 
powers. Municipal corporations must pay for construction of bridges over artificial 
channels and for replacing bridges destroyed by deepening or widening natural 
channels. Either the highway authority or the municipality within whose jurisdiction 
the street or highway lies is responsible for maintenance. (Uchtmann et al., 1986)  
In urban areas, drainage is often the responsibility of municipal corporations or special 
districts formed for storm and sanitary drainage. Illinois statutes explicitly allow for sanitary 
districts to purchase the “right to appropriate and use such levees, drains or ditches, or any 
part thereof, as it may desire, for or in connection with any improvements authorized by this 
act, and for or in connection with the purposes for which said sanitary district is organized; 
Provided, no such levee, drain or ditch shall be destroyed, removed or otherwise so used as to 
impair its usefulness for the purposes for which the same was constructed, without the con-
sent of the corporate authorities of such drainage district” (70 ILCS 2205/24). In such urban 
situations, bridge construction and maintenance is the responsibility of highway authorities 
and municipal corporations exercising storm drainage powers. 
Drains and Ditches Limiting Highway Access 
Whenever an open drain “crosses any [privately owned] enclosed tract or parcel of land in 
such a manner that a portion thereof is landlocked and has no access from any public high-
way other than by a bridge or passageway over the ditch,” the drainage district may be 
responsible for constructing a bridge or compensating the owner for the cost of construction 
in determining the value of the property or easement taken by the district. When an existing 
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ditch is deepened or widened and a new bridge or culvert becomes necessary, the district is 
also responsible for the cost (70 ILCS 605/12-5). Similarly, highway authorities must restore 
a landowner’s access to a public highway by constructing “good and sufficient culverts or 
other convenient crossings” when the highway authority constructs a ditch destroying the 
access (605 ILCS 5/9-105).  
Waterway/Floodplain Encroachment 
The Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) has the authority, under the Rivers, 
Lakes and Streams Act, to administer a permit program regulating construction within public 
bodies of water and within 100-year floodplains of inland and coastal waters of the State of 
Illinois (615 ILCS 5/18f). This requires permits from IDNR for construction in floodplains 
for watersheds that exceed 1 square mile in urban areas or 10 square miles in rural areas. 
Generally, any increase in the 100-year water surface elevation produced by a floodplain 
encroachment should not exceed 0.5 foot in rural areas and 0.1 foot in urban areas. For 
bridges and culverts, the standard allows a larger increase in water elevation (1-foot increase 
in rural areas and a 0.5 foot increase in urban areas) at the structure and the smaller increase 
(0.5 foot rural, 0.1 foot urban) 1,000 feet upstream from the structure (17 Ill. Admin Code, 
Chapter I, Section 3700). 
Highway construction within floodplains in Illinois is also controlled by Executive Order 
2006-05 titled “Construction Activities in Special Flood Hazard Areas.” This order requires 
that:  
(1). All new Critical Facilities shall be located outside of the floodplain. Where this is 
not practicable, Critical Facilities shall be developed with the lowest floor elevation 
equal to or greater than the 500-year frequency flood elevation or structurally dry 
floodproofed to at least the 500-year frequency flood elevation. 
(2). All new buildings shall be developed with the lowest floor elevation equal to or 
greater than the Flood Protection Elevation or structurally dry floodproofed to at least 
the Flood Protection Elevation. 
(3). Modifications, additions, repairs or replacement of existing structures may be 
allowed so long as the new development does not increase the floor area of the existing 
structure by more than twenty (20) percent or increase the market value of the struc-
ture by fifty (50) percent, and does not obstruct flood flows. Floodproofing activities 
are permitted and encouraged, but must comply with the requirements noted above. 
Construction in Floodplain 
The Clean Water Act defines pollutants as including “dredged spoil, solid waste, biological 
materials, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” As a result, 
under this definition, virtually any deposition of fill constitutes a point source of pollution. 
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is authorized 
to issue permits for the discharge of dredged and fill materials into the navigable waters of 
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floodway as designated by the Department in such metropolitan counties, unless such 
construction relates to an appropriate use of the floodway.” (615 ILCS 5/18g) This statute 
defined ”[a]ppropriate use of the floodway” as: 
(i) flood control structures, dikes, dams and other public works or private 
improvements relating to the control of drainage, flooding or erosion; (ii) structures 
or facilities relating to the use of, or requiring access to, the water or shoreline, 
including pumping and treatment facilities, and facilities and improvements related 
to recreational boats, commercial shipping and other functionally dependent uses; 
and (iii) any other purposes which the Department determines, by rule, to be 
appropriate to the 100-year floodway, and the periodic inundation of which will not 
pose a danger to the general health and welfare of the user, or require the expenditure 
of public funds or the provision of public resources or disaster relief services. 
Appropriate use of the floodway does not include construction of a new building 
unless such building is a garage, storage shed or other structure accessory to an existing 
building and such building does not increase flood stages. 
The precursor to this statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 19, par. 65g.) was challenged in Beverly 
Bank v. Illinois Department of Transportation (1991). In that case the plaintiff was denied a 
construction permit for two parcels located inside a defined 100-year floodway. In finding in 
favor of the Illinois Department of Transportation (prior to the Rivers Lakes and Streams Act, 
the Office of Water Resources was part of the Department of Transportation rather than the 
Department of Natural Resources), the court stated: 
We agree with defendant that the General Assembly has the authority to prohibit all 
new residential construction in the 100-year floodway. It is reasonable for the 
General Assembly to rely on the extensive research contained in the Governor’s flood 
control task force report which documented the demographic and land use changes 
which have contributed to the increased flooding in the 100-year floodway. It is 
reasonable for the General Assembly to accept the recommendation of the task force 
that a central part in the response to the severe flooding which may occur in a 100-
year flood event is the prohibition of all new residential construction in the floodway. 
It is also reasonable for the General Assembly to rely on the scientific study contained 
in the report which emphasized the importance of maintaining existing natural stor-
age areas in the watershed to reduce flood damage. 
We hold that the General Assembly has the authority, based on the police power, to 
prohibit the construction of new residences in areas which would be under water in 
the event of a 100-year flood event. For the reasons out-lined above, such legislation 
is rationally related to several legitimate State interests. For the same reasons, we find 
section 18g bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety and welfare. 
Stormwater Management 
Uchtmann et al. (1986) address the need for stormwater detention storage as follows: “In 
nonagricultural land uses and absent local ordinances specifying storm drainage and deten-
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tion requirements, owners of dominant estates may drain their lands into public drains or 
onto servient lands as long as the increased flow of surface waters is consistent with the policy 
of reasonableness of use.” However, Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT, 2011) 
policy states that: 
(a) Urban- Storage facilities shall be provided in urban and built-up areas whenever 
a significant increase in the amount of runoff occurs as a result of increased 
impermeability, reduced time of concentration, and/or the filling of natural storage 
areas. 
(b) Rural- Storage facilities shall be provided in rural areas whenever the hydraulic 
analysis indicates that flood damage will result from an increase in the amount of 
runoff occurring as a result of increased impermeability, reduced time of concentra-
tion, and/or the filling of natural storage areas.  
One significant change since the 1986 drainage manual is the expansion of regulations 
related to environmental quality. In that publication, Uchtmann et al.(1986) state “[u]ntil 
the passage of legislation in the late 1960s, the common law nuisance action was a land-
owner’s only remedy for interference in the use and enjoyment of the land. Despite today’s 
wide variety of water pollution control legislation, including statutory nuisance, it is gener-
ally limited to controlling point sources. Thus, the common law nuisance action is still 
important.” However, changes since 1986 have significantly altered this statement. In 
particular, implementation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Stormwater Program has provided regulatory measures to address non-point 
sources of pollutants. Compliance with environmental regulation is beyond the scope of this 
manual and is not discussed in detail. The aim of this section is to make highway authorities 
and land owners aware of environmental laws that may affect highway drainage. 
NPDES permits are designed to allow point source discharges into the “waters of the United 
States.” The NPDES permit program is administered by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), but the act provides that it can be delegated to a state once 
the state promulgates regulatory guidelines. The State of Illinois was delegated the authority 
to administer the NPDES permit program through the IEPA following the adoption of 
amendments to the water pollution regulations. The NPDES Stormwater Program was 
implemented in two major phases, with effective dates of October 1992 (Phase I) and March 
2003 (Phase II), respectively. 
The first phase includes discharges associated with industrial activity (including construction 
activity) and discharges from all public stormwater collection systems serving urban popula-
tions of 100,000 or more.  
The second phase addresses stormwater discharges from small municipal separate storm 
sewer systems (MS4s) (those serving fewer than 100,000 people) and construction sites that 
disturb 1 to 5 acres. Generally, Phase I MS4s are covered by individual permits and Phase II 
MS4s are covered by a general permit. Each regulated MS4 is required to develop and 
imple
storm
Chan
1
2
3
4
5
A sign
the pr
Publi
In 20
tions 
under
Regul
Pollu
and R
Code
These
Gene
ILR4
thresh
projec
equal
ment a storm
water runoff
ges made in 
. Outside u
center of a
square mil
. Within ur
serving a p
. The minim
reduced to
. Stormwat
contribute
load of po
. Return flo
charges fro
requireme
ificant chan
ovision to in
c Act 098-03
(1) adds oth
bioswales, tr
structed wet
lay out, estab
provide for d
evapotransp
and general 
09 Illinois ad
for stormwa
 the statewid
ation for Sma
tion Control
egulations 3
, Subtitle C, 
 regulations 
ral NPDES P
0 (IEPA 200
old of “land
ts that distu
 than one ac
water mana
 and prohib
Phase II: 
rbanized area
t least 10,00
e are include
banized area
opulation o
um amoun
 1 acre (0.4 
er discharge 
s to a violati
llutants to th
ws from irri
m non-poin
nts. 
ge in Illinois
corporate gr
30 modifies
er ‘green infra
ee boxes, poro
lands, and cis
lish, constru
raining or ot
iration, or co
taxation. 
opted regul
ter managem
e Stormwate
ll MS4s (Illi
 Board Rule
5 III. Adm. 
Chapter 1). 
and the Illin
ermit No. 
9) specify a s
 developmen
rb greater or
re or less tha
gement prog
it illicit disch
s, all stormw
0 people wit
d in the pro
s, almost all 
f fewer than 
t of soil distu
hectares) fro
permits are r
on of water 
e waters of t
gated agricul
t silvicultura
 drainage law
een stormwa
 the Illinois 
structure’ fa
us pavement
terns, to drai
ct, and main
herwise man
llection; and 
a-
ent 
r 
nois 
s 
ois 
ize 
t 
 
n 
24 
ram (SWM
arges. 
ater collecti
h a populati
gram. 
stormwater c
10,000 peop
rbance that 
m 5 acres (2
equired by E
quality stand
he United S
ture, agricul
l activities a
s since the 
ter infrastru
Municipal C
cilities, such a
, porous pipe 
nage purpose
tain; (2) auth
aging the run
(3) permits a
P) to reduce
on systems s
on density o
ollection sys
le, are inclu
would trigge
 hectares) in 
PA from an
ard or that c
tates. 
tural stormw
re exempt fro
1986 and 19
cture into dr
ode (65 ILC
s green roofs,
systems, nativ
s that corpora
orizes corpor
off, such as b
 combination
 the contami
erving a pop
f at least 1,0
tems, as wel
ded in the pr
r a permit r
most cases. 
y discharger 
ontributed a
ater runoff, 
m NPDES 
97 drainage 
ainage desig
S 5/11-110-
 rain gardens
e plantings, 
te authoritie
ate authoriti
y infiltration
 of special ass
nation of 
ulation 
00 people pe
l as those 
ogram. 
equirement i
that 
 substantial 
and dis-
permit 
manuals is 
n. Illinois 
1) as follows
, 
con-
s may 
es to 
, 
essment 
r 
s 
:  
25 
one acre for discharges from construction activity for a larger common plan of development 
or sale that would disturb one acre or more.”  
IEPA (2009) requirements for MS4 permits include: 
1. Developing a stormwater management program comprising best management 
practices (BMPs) and measurable goals for each of the following six minimum con-
trol measures:  
 Public education and outreach on stormwater impacts 
 Public involvement and participation 
 Illicit discharge detection and elimination 
 Construction-site stormwater runoff control 
 Post-construction stormwater management in new development and 
redevelopment 
 Pollution prevention/good housekeeping for municipal operations 
2. Submitting a completed Notice of Intent; and 
3. Submitting an annual report to IEPA in June of each year. 
The Illinois stormwater regulations specify Post-Construction Standards for New 
Development as follows: 
The permittee should require the person responsible for the construction or new 
development to adopt one or more of these strategies, in order of preference, or provide 
a rationale for selecting a more preferred strategy:  
i. Preservation of the natural features of development sites, including natural storage 
and infiltration characteristics;  
ii. Preservation of existing natural stream channels, and drainage ways;  
iii. Minimization of new impervious surfaces;  
iv. Conveyance of stormwater in open vegetated channels;  
v. Construction of structures that provide both quantity and quality control, with 
structures serving multiple sites being preferable to those serving individual sites; and  
vi. Construction of structures that provide only quality control, with structures 
serving multiple sites being preferable to those serving individual sites. 
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act states, “Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to 
conduct any activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, 
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or 
permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates.” The IEPA 
provides water quality certification pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. This 
certification is mandatory for all projects requiring a Section 404 permit from the Corps of 
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Engineers. In addition to determining that the proposed work will not violate the applicable 
water quality standards, the IEPA also makes a determination of additional permit and 
regulatory requirements pursuant to the Illinois Pollution Control Board rules and 
regulations, such as for hauling and disposal of dredged material. 
A recent federal case that may impact stormwater drainage design is Ecological Rights 
Foundation v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (2013). In that case the Ecological Rights 
Foundation filed a citizen suit against Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) alleging that PG&E 
had violated the Clean Water Act by “discharging ‘pollutant-bearing stormwater runoff’ from 
their utility poles into the waters of the United States without an NPDES permit.” The 
source of the pollutants cited in the complaint was wood preservative leaching from the 
utility poles. In their opinion dismissing the Ecological Rights Foundations suit, the court 
stated, “Stormwater runoff is a nonpoint or point source … depending on whether it is 
allowed to run off naturally (and is thus a nonpoint source) or is collected, channeled, and 
discharged through a system of ditches, culverts, channels, and similar conveyances (and is 
thus a point source discharge).”  
At the time of this writing, the authors are unaware of any court cases related to Illinois 
Stormwater Regulations for Small MS4s. 
Agricultural Drainage 
Drainage Districts 
Natural drainage rules do not adequately meet the needs of landowners in many parts of the 
state—particularly in the flat prairie areas and in river bottoms, where both drainage and 
flood protection are needed. To cover the inadequacies of the natural drainage rules and to 
give landowners a means of securing proper drainage, the legislature in 1879 passed two laws, 
the Levee Act and the Farm Drainage Act. These laws provide for drainage districts based on a 
system of assessments that permitted the districts to include only lands benefited (Uchtmann 
and Gehris, 1997).  
The organization of drainage districts in Illinois is governed by the Illinois Drainage Code (70 
ILCS 605/Art. III). While drainage districts are authorized by the Illinois Drainage Code, 
they are not specifically created by it. The legislation provides the legal framework for drain-
age districts and gives them certain powers but leaves organization and formation of the dis-
trict up to local citizens.  
Drainage districts are limited in which landowners they can include in the district and 
thereby include in their assessments. If landowners have adequate drainage under natural 
drainage, they do not receive the benefits of a drainage district, and their land cannot be in-
cluded in a drainage district against their wishes. Uchtmann and Gehris (1997) state, “The 
mere fact that the ditches of a drainage district carry off water that originates on this land 
does not mean, in a legal sense, that the owners are necessarily benefited by the drainage dis-
trict. Land may not be included in a drainage district nor be assessed by the district against 
the owners’ will unless it can be shown that the property will be materially benefited by the 
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beneficial to society, reduce damage from flooding, improve water quality, and provide high-
quality habitat for fish and wildlife. 
Federal Wetlands Regulation 
Under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps) oversaw the regulation of discharges into navigable waterways. In the 
1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [now commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act (CWA)], rock and sand were included among lists of “pollutants.” The 
1972 amendments defined the scope of the CWA as “the waters of the United States.” 
Under authority derived from the CWA, the Corps’ jurisdiction now applies to discharges of 
“dredged or fill material” into all “waters of the United States,” which the Corps has defined 
as covering interstate waters and wetlands, intrastate waters whose “use, degradation or 
destruction … could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” tributaries of those protected 
waters, and wetlands adjacent to protected waters. Under Section 404 of the CWA the Corps 
is authorized to grant permits for discharges of “dredged or fill material” into protected 
waters at specific locations.  
Amendments to Section 404 of the CWA in 1977 established a program to regulate the 
discharge of dredged and fill material into waters of the United States, including wetlands. 
Activities regulated under that program include water resource projects (such as dams and 
levees) and conversion of wetlands to farming and forestry. 
The Corps and EPA have key regulatory responsibilities under the Section 404 program. The 
Section 404 program requires that no discharge of dredged or fill material can be permitted 
if a practicable alternative exists that is less damaging to the aquatic environment or if the 
nation’s waters would be significantly degraded. In other words, a permit application must 
show that the applicant has: 
1. taken steps to avoid wetland impacts, where practicable;
2. minimized potential impacts to wetlands; and
3. provided compensation for any remaining, unavoidable impacts through activities to
restore or create wetlands.
Illinois Wetland Regulations 
States may administer their own permit programs for wetlands as long as their proposed 
programs comply with the minimum requirements set by the EPA that must be met to issue 
such permits. Illinois’ Interagency Wetlands Policy Act of 1989 (IWPA 20 ILCS 830/) estab-
lished a wetland regulatory program that authorizes the Illinois Department of Natural 
Resources (IDNR) to regulate state-funded projects and activities that impact wetlands 
(Environmental Law Institute, 2007). Additionally, the Rivers, Lakes, and Streams Act (615 
ILCS 5/) provides the IDNR peripheral regulatory authority to regulate construction activi-
ties in floodplains; anyone proposing such activities must first secure a permit from IDNR. 
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Drainage improvements otherwise allowed under the Illinois Drainage Code are discouraged 
or prohibited by these additional laws protecting wetlands (Uchtmann and Gehris, 1997). 
The Illinois Department of Transportation has developed a Wetlands Action Plan (IDOT, 
1998)that calls for policies and procedures that address adverse wetlands impacts prioritized 
as follows, while giving due consideration to safety and appropriate design standards: 
First priority:   Avoidance of adverse wetland impacts 
Second priority:   Minimization of adverse wetland impacts 
Third priority:  Compensation for unavoidable adverse wetland impacts in 
accordance with the ratios in 17 Ill. Admin. Code Ch. I, Sec. 
1090 
Wetland impacts of less than 0.3 acre resulting from IDOT-funded projects will be compen-
sated for from a wetland compensation account site or other approved source of pre-existing 
wetland credits. Compensation for unavoidable adverse impacts of 0.3 acre or more will be 
provided prior to or concurrent with the project action that causes the wetland impact, with 
priority given to locating the compensation as close to the impacted wetlands as practical. If 
a wetland compensation plan that meets the objectives of the act cannot be developed, or if 
unique opportunities exist to further the goals of the act through other means, approval may 
be requested from IDNR for the following: 
1. Acquisition of high-quality wetlands and associated buffer; 
2. Funding of needed relevant research; or 
3. Wetlands compensation that provides replacement of the same and different wetland 
types as the adversely impacted wetlands. 
In addition to a wetland compensation plan, steps must be taken to ensure that 
compensation wetlands are maintained for wetlands purposes. This may involve transferring 
the property to IDNR or another suitable entity to assume responsibility for long-term 
management of wetland compensation sites or requiring the local agency with jurisdiction of 
the site to ensure that the site will be maintained for wetlands purposes. 
Illinois statutes also require a permit from IDNR for construction by highway authorities, by 
drainage districts, or by individuals when such construction is located in any stream or flood-
way draining more than 1 square mile in an urban area or 10 square miles in a rural area. 
Specifically exempted from the rules are field tile systems, tile outlet structures, terraces, 
water and sediment control basins, grade stabilization structures, and grassed waterways that 
do not obstruct flows. In addition, most of the maintenance and repair of existing structures 
is excluded. The law applies to any person, corporation, unit of local government, or state 
agency (615 ILCS 5/29a). 
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Jurisdiction of Wetlands Regulations 
A key question concerning wetlands regulations is which wetlands fall under the jurisdiction 
of federal law. The Corps initially approached its jurisdiction as it had under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act, as “[n]avigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject to 
the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may 
be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce” (33 C.F.R. pt. 329). 
Because wetlands are generally not navigable, this early definition excluded most wetlands 
and other isolated waters from CWA jurisdiction. Strand and Rothschild (2010) state that 
“environmental groups challenged these regulations, arguing that the regulatory jurisdiction 
of the CWA extended beyond traditionally navigable waters to a broader aquatic system, 
including small streams, tributaries, and wetlands.” In Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Callaway (1975), a federal district court found that the Corps’ defined “navigable waters” too 
narrowly under the CWA. Following the guidance of the court and the CWA’s legislative 
history, the Corps revised its regulations to include a broader range of waters, including adja-
cent wetlands and isolated waters, giving the definition of “navigable waters” the broadest 
constitutional interpretation possible. 
In2001 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2001). In this case a consortium of 
villages and cities in the Chicago metropolitan area sought to develop a landfill for non-
hazardous solid waste on a 533-acre site that had formerly been a sand/gravel mine. This site 
contained several ponds that would be filled in as part of the plan. These ponds were isolated 
from navigable waters. SWANCC applied for a Corps of Engineers Section 404 permit, 
which was denied, with the Corps citing use of the ponds by migratory birds as the basis for 
its jurisdiction over the site. The court rejected this argument on a 5–4 vote. The court 
stated that not only would the recognition of the Migratory Bird Rule be inappropriate under 
the language of the CWA for “isolated” and “intrastate” waters, but also that in this particu-
lar case it would raise constitutional concerns about the “significant impingement of the 
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.” 
We said in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word “navigable” in the statute was of 
“limited effect” and went on to hold that §404(a) extended to nonnavigable wet-
lands adjacent to open waters. But it is one thing to give a word limited effect and 
quite another to give it no effect whatever. 
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of 
Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result. … 
This concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal–
state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power. 
(Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 2001) 
In two more recent cases (Rapanos v. United States, 2006; Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2004), which the Supreme Court consolidated (Rapanos et ux., et al. v. United 
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States, 2006), the Supreme Court again addressed the Corps’ jurisdiction over isolated 
wetlands.  
[T]he phrase “waters of the United States” includes only those relatively permanent, 
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water “forming geographic features” that 
are described in ordinary parlance as “streams,” “oceans,” “rivers,” and “lakes,” 
Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed.), and does not include 
channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that 
periodically provide drainage for rainfall. The Corps’ expansive interpretation of that 
phrase is thus not “based on a permissible construction of the statute. . . .”  
And the CWA itself categorizes the channels and conduits that typically carry 
intermittent flows of water separately from “navigable waters,” including them in the 
definition of “point sources, . . .”  
Isolated ponds are not “waters of the United States” in their own right. … Thus, 
only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are “waters of 
the United States” in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between 
the two, are “adjacent” to such waters and covered by the Act. (Rapanos v. United 
States, 2004) 
In a concurring opinion on Rapanos, the Chief Justice stated that interested parties may lack 
guidance “on precisely how to read Congress’ limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act” 
and would be left “to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.” In analyzing these decisions, 
Strand and Rothschild (2010) state, “Albeit in significantly divided opinions, the Supreme 
Court has now twice expressed the position that Congress had intended some limits on fed-
eral jurisdiction, given the use of the term ‘navigable’ and the statutory recognition of a 
major role for the states. Absent a change to the statute or precedent of the Supreme Court, 
the limit has to be addressed by the federal agencies.” 
In another decision related to Section 404 permitting of wetlands (Sackett v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2012), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial 
review of agency decisions related to Section 404 permitting. The Sacketts own a 2/3-acre lot 
near Priest Lake, Idaho, on property separated from the lake by several lots containing 
permanent structures. In preparation for building a house, the Sacketts filled part of their lot 
with dirt and rock. Months later, they received a compliance order from the U.S. EPA 
indicating that their site was a wetland and that the fill was an ongoing point source dis-
charge of pollutants to waters of the United States. The compliance order further required 
them to restore their site and provide EPA with access to the site. The Sacketts requested a 
hearing, but their request was denied, prompting them to seek remedy in the courts. In 
reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court stated, “[T]here is no reason to think that the 
Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into 
‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of 
the question of whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction. Compliance 
orders will remain an effective means of securing prompt voluntary compliance in those 
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many cases where there is no substantial basis to question their validity” (Sackett v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). 
Several recent cases have raised questions about the reach of the wetlands permitting required 
under the Clean Water Act. The results of these cases indicate that the reach is more limited 
than previously was required but that clear-cut guidance is not available at present and 
jurisdiction must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In response to these rulings the U.S. 
EPA in April 2014 proposed a new rule redefining the “[w]aters of the United States” that 
greatly broadens the reach of the Clean Water Act (Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 76, 
Monday, April 21, 2014). Of significance for highway authorities, under the proposed rule, 
for the first time, man-made waterways and water bodies such as ditches could be considered 
jurisdictional under the Clean Water Act. The proposed rule states, “A tributary, including 
wetlands, can be a natural, man-altered, or man-made water and includes waters such as 
rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, impoundments, canals, and ditches.” The proposed rule does 
exclude “ditches that are excavated wholly in uplands, drain only uplands, and have less than 
perennial flow5 and ditches that do not contribute flow, either directly or through another 
water, to a traditional navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas or a jurisdictional 
impoundment” (Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 76, Monday, April 21, 2014). 
It should be noted that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) also has a wetland 
program (commonly known as “Swampbuster”) authorized under the Food Security Act of 
1985 as amended by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 and the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Under these provisions, any person 
who clears, drains, dredges, levels, or alters a wetland after December 23, 1985, to produce 
an agricultural commodity shall be ineligible for USDA program benefits on all land owned 
or operated in an amount proportionate to the severity of the violation. The USDA defini-
tion of wetland is “areas that have a predominance of hydric soils and that are inundated or 
saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and 
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation typically 
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions” (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2010). 
The National Resources Conservation Service (2005) warns that certified wetland 
determination/delineation for the purpose of implementing wetland conservation provisions 
of the Food Security Act of 1985 “may not be valid for identifying the extent of the COE’s 
[Corps of Engineers] Clean Water Act jurisdiction” (National Resources Conservation 
Service, 2005). More details about the USDA wetlands program are provided by Uchtmann 
and Gehris (1997). 
In Illinois, Section 1-6 of the Illinois Interagency Wetland Policy Act of 1989 (20 ILCS 830/1-
6) defines a wetland as: 
land that has a predominance of hydric soils (soils which are usually wet and where 
there is little or no free oxygen) and that is inundated or saturated by surface or 
                                                 
5 In other words, an ephemeral stream. 
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groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under nor-
mal circumstances does support, a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation (plants 
typically found in wet habitats) typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. 
Areas which are restored or created as the result of mitigation or planned construction 
projects and which function as a wetland are included within this definition even 
when all three wetland parameters are not present. 
This definition avoids the questions of jurisdiction that are raised regarding the CWA’s use 
of the term “waters of the United States” and, at the time of this writing, the authors are 
unaware of any cases questioning Illinois’ jurisdiction embodied in the Illinois Interagency 
Wetland Policy Act of 1989. 
Other Drainage Topics 
Groundwater Related to Drainage  
In the Water Use Act of 1983, the General Assembly changed the legal policy of groundwater 
being the property of the landowner to state that “[t]he rule of ‘reasonable use’ shall apply to 
groundwater withdrawals in the State (525 ILCS 45/6).” In discussing the implications of 
this statute on highway drainage, Christopher (2004) states, “The only reported case which 
has interpreted this language concerned a homeowner whose well dried up when a drainage 
ditch next to her home was deepened and enlarged [Bridgman v. Sanitary District of Decatur, 
1987]. The court reviewed the legislative history and decided the phrase ‘reasonable use’ in 
this act has the same meaning as the doctrine of reasonable use in disputes over the use of 
water in streams by riparian owners. In those riparian cases each user is entitled to use the 
resource as long as no other’s use is unreasonably deprived. This means that groundwater is a 
shared resource. This provision can come into play when a highway ditch affects the levels of 
an adjacent pond or well. The highway authority is probably not responsible for all damages 
but can probably be held responsible for damage which could have been avoided by 
undertaking reasonable precautions.” 
Summary 
The following is a summary of the drainage laws and regulations discussed previously. This 
section is organized to follow the sections in which these principles were more fully pre-
sented. 
The Law of Natural Drainage 
The basic principle guiding drainage law in Illinois is referred to as the Law of Natural 
Drainage: “Landowners, including highway authorities, have a right to drain water away as it 
would in a state of nature. Lower landowners, including highway authorities, have a re-
sponsibility to accept water flowing naturally onto or through their lands and have no right 
to interfere with such natural drainage” (Uchtmann et al., 1986). This means that the owner 
of dominant (higher) land cannot change the course of flow or render it more rapid or divert 
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from one watershed to another and that the owner of the servient (lower) land cannot do 
anything to hinder his or her grounds from receiving the flow from the dominant land. 
Because practices that increase the productivity of agricultural land tend to increase the 
runoff of water from that land, the Illinois Supreme Court developed the Good Husbandry 
Exception that allows the owners of dominant land to increase the amount of flow from their 
land “in the interests of good husbandry” provided that the point where the discharge 
entered the servient estate was not altered. While the Good Husbandry Exception was origi-
nally established for development of agricultural land, court decisions over the years have 
expanded it to any legitimate farming operation and even strictly non-agricultural develop-
ment as long as the resulting drainage meets a “reasonableness limitation.” 
The Reasonable Use Limitation says that a landowner is legally privileged to make a reasona-
ble use of his or her land, even though the resulting alteration of the flow of surface water 
may cause some harm to others. The landowner is liable for the harm to the extent that the 
harm is tied to an unreasonable development of the higher land. The burden of proving that 
the land development was unreasonable falls on the plaintiff. Determining whether the 
development was reasonable is done on a case-by-case basis that considers both the benefit to 
the dominant estate and the harm to the servient estate. 
Easements 
An easement is an interest in another’s land that allows the easement owner to use the other’s 
land for special purposes consistent with the other’s general property rights; for example, the 
right to have water flow across a neighbor’s land. Drainage easements can be created by 
nature, by agreement, by condemnation, or by prescription. An easement in or over 
another’s land provides the easement holder the right of access to do all such things as are 
necessary to preserve the easement. If the beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the ease-
ment disappears and the landowner resumes his or her full and unencumbered interest in the 
land. 
Highway Drainage 
The interaction of the drainage features of highways with those of the adjoining lands that 
they cross is governed by the same rules applying to private land. By Illinois statute, highway 
authorities can obtain drainage easements by deed, by prescription, or by eminent domain 
(condemnation). Illinois statutes also permit highway authorities to convey water from the 
highway in a direction other than its natural course. Therefore, a highway authority can 
divert water as long as it has acquired the necessary easements from affected parties. Because 
the highway authorities own only an easement in the highway land and the fee remains in 
the adjoining owner, highway authorities have no right to grant abutting landowners the 
privilege of digging a ditch along the highway fronting the property of another landowner. 
The Illinois Highway Code imposes on the highway authorities the duty to “construct, main-
tain, and repair the highways” within their jurisdiction. If the highway is benefited by a 
highway drain or ditch it is likely that the highway authority is responsible for the 
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maintenance costs. Similarly, the highway authority is responsible to inspect bridges and 
culverts on public streets and highways. 
According to the Illinois Drainage Code, highway authorities generally must construct and 
maintain bridges whenever a natural drain or ditch constructed in the original natural drain-
age crosses a public highway. 
Waterway/Floodplain Encroachments 
Construction projects in Illinois waterways, floodplains, and wetlands often require both 
state and federal authorization. Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, virtually any 
deposition of fill constitutes a point source of pollution and is therefore subject to permit 
approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under the Rivers, Lakes and Streams Act 
the Illinois Department of Natural Resources Office of Water Resources (DNR/OWR) is 
given authority to issue permits for dams, for any construction within a public body of water, 
and for construction within floodways. Generally, floodway projects also require local 
authorization. Additionally, revisions of floodway maps may require approval from 
IDNR/OWR and from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Addition 
special provisions apply for projects in the six counties served by the Northeastern Illinois 
Planning Commission and all projects in or along Lake Michigan. 
Stormwater Management 
A significant change since the 1986 drainage manual is the expansion of regulations related 
to environmental quality. Implementation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) Stormwater Program has provided regulatory measures to address non-
point sources of pollutants. Phase I of the program, implemented in 1992, includes 
discharges associated with industrial activity and discharges from all public stormwater 
collection systems serving urban populations of 100,000 or more. Phase II of the program, 
implemented in 2003, expands the program to address stormwater discharges from small 
municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) serving a population center of at least 10,000 
people with a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile and construction 
sites that disturb more than 1 acre. Illinois requires MS4 permits for projects that disturb 
more than 1 acre, or less than 1 acre for discharges from construction activity for a larger 
common plan of development or sale that would disturb 1 acre or more. The MS4 permit 
should include a stormwater management program comprised of best management practices 
(BMPs) and measurable goals for six minimum control measures, as well as a Notice of 
Intent and an annual report to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. (IEPA) 
Agricultural Drainage 
Illinois law provides for the creation of drainage districts to give landowners a means of 
securing proper drainage and provides for a system of assessments that includes only the 
lands benefited by the district. The drainage code allows drainage districts to “use any part of 
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any public highway for the purposes of work to be done, provided such use will not perma-
nently destroy or materially impair such public highway for public use.” 
Regulation/Drainage of Wetlands 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) amendments of 1977 established a program to 
regulate the discharge of dredged and fill material into the waters of the United States, 
including wetlands. Activities regulated under that program include water resource projects 
(such as dams and levees) and conversion of wetlands to farming and forestry. The Corps of 
Engineers and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) have regula-
tory responsibilities to ensure that permit applicants have:  
1. taken steps to avoid wetland impacts; 
2. minimized potential impacts to wetlands; and 
3. provided compensation for any remaining, unavoidable impacts through activities to 
restore or create wetlands. 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has different definitions of wetlands 
than “the waters of the United States” used in the CWA. The USDA administers agricultural 
benefit programs, and any clearing, draining, dredging, leveling, or altering a wetland to pro-
duce an agricultural commodity results in ineligibility for USDA program benefits. Because 
of the different definitions of wetlands, the Natural Resources Conservation Service’s 
(NRCS) wetland delineation may not be valid for identifying jurisdictional wetlands of the 
CWA Section 404 program. 
Illinois’ Interagency Wetlands Policy Act of 1989 established a wetland regulatory program that 
authorizes IDNR to regulate state-funded projects and activities that impact wetlands. 
Additionally, the Rivers, Lakes, and Streams Act (615 ILCS 5/) provides the IDNR peripheral 
regulatory authority to regulate construction activities in floodplains; anyone proposing such 
activities must first secure a permit from IDNR. 
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Glossary 
Adverse. (1) A right that is contrary to the interest or claim of another, such as an easement 
across another’s property. (2) Harmful or unfavorable. 
Annual exceedance probability (AEP). The probability that a flood or event of the 
specified magnitude will be equaled or exceeded in any year. For example, a flood with a 1% 
AEP has a 1 in 100 chance of being exceeded in any year. A variety of terms are often used to 
describe the chance of an event, but the preferred method is the annual exceedance probabil-
ity. 
Artificial watercourse. A watercourse generally owing its origin to acts of man. Examples are 
canals, drainage ditches, and subsurface drains.  
Basin. A natural or artificially created space or structure that is capable of holding water by 
reason of its shape and the character of its confining material; the surface area within a given 
watershed.  
Berm. A constructed barrier of compacted earth, rock, or gravel. 
Best management practices (BMPs). Schedules of activities, prohibitions of practices, 
maintenance procedures, and other management practices to prevent or reduce the pollution 
of waters. BMPs also include treatment requirements, operating procedures, and practices to 
control site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste disposal, or drainage from raw material 
storage. With regard to construction, BMPs may include structural devices or nonstructural 
practices that are designed to prevent pollutants from entering water or to direct the flow of 
water. 
Bridge. A structure erected on foundations, piers, or abutments over a depression or an 
obstacle such as a river, roadway, or railroad; it carries a roadway for vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic and provides an opening greater than 20 feet.  
Catch basin. A chamber or well, usually built at the curb line of a street and combined with 
an inlet, for the admission of surface water to a sewer or subdrain, having at its base a sedi-
ment sump designed to retain grit and detritus below the point of overflow. 
Catchment. Synonymous with drainage basin, especially in British literature. In the United 
States “catchment” often refers to a small area. The area of land, defined based on the 
topography that collects and discharges surface runoff past a defined outlet point. 
Channel. (1) A natural or artificial watercourse of perceptible extent that periodically or 
continuously contains moving water or which forms a connecting link between two bodies of 
water. It has a definite bed and banks, which serve to confine the water. (2) The deep por-
tion of a river or waterway that is used by watercraft. 
Civil law. A written code of laws that originated in ancient Rome and that is still used in 
many countries. It is distinguished from English common law, which is based on statutes 
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and court decisions. (Louisiana is the only state now under civil law, although Illinois and 
some others have adopted natural drainage rules like those in the civil law.)  
Codification. The rearrangement of all the laws on a particular subject under one general 
title and in one place.  
Common enemy rule. “Surface water is a common enemy, and each landowner has an 
unlimited legal privilege to deal with it as he or she pleases without regard to the 
consequences that might be suffered by a neighbor” (Crowell v. Marshall County Drainage 
Board, 2012). Opposed to it is the natural drainage rule, which requires the owner of lower 
land to accept surface water that naturally drains onto that land.  
Common law. The body of principles that evolved from traditional usage and custom and 
that now receives judicial recognition and sanction through repeated application. These 
principles develop independent of legislation and are embodied in court decisions.  
Condemnation. A legal proceeding to secure private land for a public purpose after 
reasonable payment for it. Condemnation proceedings are used when an owner does not 
convey title voluntarily. Eminent domain proceedings are condemnation proceedings.  
Contiguous. Adjacent or touching.  
Critical facility. Critical facility means any facility that is critical to the health and welfare of 
the population and, if flooded, would create an added dimension to the disaster. The 
determination of critical facilities should be made by each agency (State of Illinois, 2006).  
Culvert. A closed conduit other than a bridge that conveys water in a natural channel or 
waterway beneath and across a roadway.  
Defendant. The person or group defending or denying; the party against whom relief or 
recovery is sought in an action or suit; the accused in a criminal case.  
Diffused surface water. Water that flows across land in no defined channel.  
Ditch. An artificially constructed open drain or a natural drain that has been artificially im-
proved.  
Diversion. The deflection of surface waters or stream waters into a watercourse to which 
they are not naturally tributary.  
Divide. The watershed or peak of land from which the heads of streams or runoff waters 
flow in opposite directions.  
Dominant estate or tenement. In a drainage context, the dominant estate is higher land 
from which water naturally flows. The land to which the water naturally flows is the servient 
estate.  
Dominant land. Property so situated that its owners have rights on adjacent property, such 
as a right-of-way or a right of natural drainage. The adjacent land is called the servient land.  
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Drain. Any ditch, watercourse, or conduit, whether open, covered, or enclosed, natural or 
artificial, or partly natural and partly artificial, by which waters coming or falling upon lands 
are carried away.  
Drainage. The general term applied to the removal of surface or groundwater from a given 
area either by gravity or by pumping.  
Drainage area. The measure of the size of a drainage basin. Often this term is incorrectly 
used as the area from which water originates at a given point or location on a stream (drain-
age basin).  
Drainage basin. The area of land, defined based on the topography, that collects and dis-
charges surface runoff past a defined outlet point. See also catchment and watershed. 
Drainage district. A legal entity formed to construct, maintain, or repair drains or levees or 
to enlarge other drainage or levee work for agricultural, sanitary, or mining purposes.  
Drainage structures. Structures other than drains, levees, and pumping plants that are 
intended to promote or aid drainage. Such structures may be independent of other drainage 
work, or they may be a part of or incidental to such work. The term includes but is not re-
stricted to catch basins, bulkheads, spillways, flumes, drop boxes, pipe outlets, junction 
boxes, and structures whose primary purpose is to prevent the erosion of soil into a drain (70 
ILCS 605/1-2). 
Drainage system. A system by which lands are drained and protected from overflow, 
including use of drains, drainage structures, levees, and pumping plants.  
Easement. An interest in another’s land that allows the easement owner limited use of the 
other’s land for special purposes consistent with the other’s general property rights; for 
example, the right to have water flow across a neighbor’s land.  
Elevation. Altitude; height in relation to sea level or any assumed datum.  
Eminent domain. The power of the state to take private property for public use.  
Ephemeral stream. A stream that flows only in direct response to precipitation. Such a 
stream receives no water from springs, and no long-continued supply from melting snow or 
other surface source. Its channel is at all times above the water table. The term may be 
arbitrarily restricted to streams or stretches of streams that do not flow continuously during 
periods of as much as one month. 
Erosion. Wearing away of land surface by running water, wind, or other geological agents.  
Fee. A fee is a title or an estate retained indefinitely as rightful owner. 
Floodplain. The normally dry land area adjoining rivers, streams, lakes, bays, or oceans that 
is inundated during flood events. The 100-year floodplain is the area inundated by a flood 
with a 1 in 100 (1%) annual exceedance probability. 
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Flood water. Former stream waters that have escaped a watercourse to flow or stand over 
adjoining lands.  
Floodway. Floodway includes the channel of the stream and the adjacent land areas that 
must be reserved in order to discharge the design flood without cumulatively increasing the 
water surface by more than a given amount. 
Flow line. The bed of a stream or culvert.  
Highway. Any public way for vehicular travel laid out pursuant to any law of the State or the 
Territory of Illinois; or which has been established by dedication or used by the public as a 
highway for 15 years; or which has been or may be laid out to connect a subdivision or 
plotted land with a public highway and that has been dedicated for the use of the owners of 
the land in the subdivision or platted land where such dedication has been accepted and used 
and which has not been vacated pursuant to law. The term “highway” includes rights-of-way, 
bridges, drainage structures, signs, guardrails, protective structures, and all other structures 
and appurtenances necessary or convenient for vehicular traffic. A highway in a rural area 
may be called a road, while a highway in a municipal area may be called a street (605 ILCS 
5/2-202).  
Highway authority. The state department concerned with state highways; the county board 
with respect to county highways or county unit district roads if a discretionary function is 
involved; the county engineer or superintendent of highways if a ministerial function is 
involved; the highway commissioner with respect to township or district roads not in a 
county unit road district; or the corporate authorities of a municipality with respect to 
municipal streets (605 ILCS 5/2-213).  
Hydrophytic vegetation. Hydrophytic vegetation is defined by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (1987) as: “the sum total of macrophytic plant life that occurs in areas where the 
frequency and duration of inundation or soil saturation produce permanently or periodically 
saturated soils of sufficient duration to exert a controlling influence on the plant species 
present. The vegetation occurring in a wetland may consist of more than one plant commu-
nity (species association). …Thus, the presence of scattered individuals of an upland plant 
species in a community dominated by hydrophytic species is not a sufficient basis for 
concluding that the area is an upland community. Likewise, the presence of a few individuals 
of a hydrophytic species in a community dominated by upland species is not a sufficient 
basis for concluding that the area has hydrophytic vegetation.” 
Injunction. A judicial order requiring one to do or refrain from doing a particular act.  
Invert. The floor, bottom, or lowest portion of the internal cross section of a conduit.  
Jurisdiction. The authority or range of authority for a governing body.  
Land. Real property, including but not restricted to lots, railroad rights-of-way, public high-
ways, streets and alleys, and easements.  
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Landowner. The owner of real property, including an owner of an undivided interest, a life 
tenant, a remainderman, and a trustee under an active trust; but not including a mortgagee, a 
trustee under a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage, a lien holder, or a lessee.  
Lien. A legal claim against particular property for services rendered the property. A drainage 
assessment is a legal claim against an assessed property.  
Limited fee. Limited fee refers to a fee that ceases with the existence of certain conditions 
with the following characteristics: (1) It is a right to use the surface of the land for a specific 
purpose; (2) such land has definite boundaries which must be recorded with the federal 
government; (3) it cannot be conveyed to be used for any purpose other than that specified 
in the grant and cannot be taken by adverse possession for any other purpose; (5) when the 
limited fee is abandoned or forfeited it can only be by virtue of federal statute or regulation 
and the fee reverts back to the United States; (6) a limited fee owner has a superior right to 
the surface of the land against anyone else; (7) it is used for railroads, pipelines, power plants, 
irrigation ditches and reservoirs, canals, etc. for authority as to the foregoing conclusions.  
Litigate. To pursue in court through a lawsuit.  
Maintenance. Preserving and keeping each type of roadway, roadside, structure, and facility 
as close as possible to its original condition or as later improved.  
Municipal separate storm sewer system (MS4). The regulatory definition of an MS4 (40 
CFR 122.26(b)(8)) is “a conveyance or system of conveyances (including roads with drainage 
systems, municipal streets, catch basins, curbs, gutters, ditches, man-made channels, or storm 
drains): (i) Owned or operated by a state, city, town, borough, county, parish, district, 
association, or other public body (created to or pursuant to state law) including special dis-
tricts under state law such as a sewer district, flood control district or drainage district, or 
similar entity, or an Indian tribe or an authorized Indian tribal organization, or a designated 
and approved management agency under Section 208 of the Clean Water Act that discharges 
into waters of the United States; (ii) Designed or used for collecting or conveying storm-
water; (iii) Which is not a combined sewer; and (iv) Which is not part of a Publicly Owned 
Treatment Works (POTW) as defined at 40 CFR 122.2.” 
Natural drainage rule. Where two adjoining pieces of land are so situated that one is domi-
nant and the other servient, the dominant landowner has the right to have water flow 
naturally from his or her land to that of the servient landowner.  
Natural watercourse. The course followed by water where the conformation of land is such 
that it gives the water a fixed and determinate course and discharges it uniformly upon the 
servient tract at a fixed and definite point.  
Non-possessory interest. A non-possessory interest in land is the right to use or restrict the 
use of another person’s land. While the holder of a non-possessory interest has certain and 
clear-cut rights in regard to the use of a property, he or she does not hold title to the 
property. Non-possessory interests do not constitute ownership of the land itself: holders of a 
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non-possessory interest in real property do not have title, and the owner of the land 
continues to enjoy the full rights of ownership, subject to any encumbrances. 
Perennial stream. A stream that flows continuously at all seasons of a year and during dry as 
well as wet years. Such streams are usually fed by groundwater, and their water surface 
generally stands at a lower level than that of the water table in the locality. 
Perpetual easement. Perpetual easement is a type of easement that is to last without any 
limitation of time. 
Plaintiff. A person who brings an action; the party who complains or sues in a civil action 
and is so named on the record; a person who seeks remedial relief for an injury to rights; a 
complainant; the prosecution in a criminal case.  
Plans. Approved drawings or reproductions of drawings pertaining to the construction or 
details of work.  
Prescriptive easement. An easement or interest in another’s land acquired by regular use of 
the land for some purpose rather than being purchased, negotiated, or granted. In drainage 
this is an easement allowing drainage through a ditch, drain, or culvert onto or across the 
land of another. In order to acquire this right, open, adverse, and uninterrupted use of the 
drainage facility must be shown under a claim of right for the required time.  
Promulgate. The act of publishing or announcing officially.  
Proprietor. An owner or a person who has legal title or exclusive right to some property, 
whether in possession or not.  
Public road. A road constructed on dedicated right-of-way and accepted by a public agency.  
Quasi-corporations. Organizations resembling corporations; municipal societies or similar 
bodies.  
Quiet title. A legal proceeding to establish a party’s title to real property against anyone and 
everyone, and thus “quiet” any challenges or claims to the title.  
Right-of-way. The entire area reserved for the construction and maintenance of a roadway 
and the improvement of the roadsides.  
Right-of-way plan. A number of right-of-way plats indicating all rights-of-way in one 
particular section.  
Right-of-way plat. A drawing of a tract of right-of-way to be acquired from property 
owners. The plat shows location, width, length, acreage, and legal description of the tract.  
Roadway. That portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel.  
Rural area. All locations outside an urban area.  
Servient estate or tenement. An estate that owes a duty or a service to another estate. The 
dominant tenement is the estate to which the duty or service is owed.  
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Servient land. If two adjoining pieces of land are so situated that one piece is at a lower 
elevation than the other, the lower piece of land is considered to be servient.  
Sewage. The water supply of a community after it has been fouled by various uses. It may be 
a combination of the wastes carried from residences, business buildings, institutions, and 
industrial establishments together with such groundwater, surface water, and stormwater as 
may be present.  
Silviculture. Silviculture is the branch of forestry dealing with the establishment, growth, 
composition, health, and quality of forests and woodlands. 
Statute of limitations. An act of the legislature that sets a period of time within which a 
legal action must be brought. In the case of interests in land, the period is usually 20 years 
from the time the right to sue first arises. The statute makes the defendant immune from suit 
after the term has expired.  
Statutory law. Laws enacted by the General Assembly to enlarge or change the common 
law.  
Stream water. Former surface or groundwaters that have entered and now flow in a well-
defined natural watercourse together with other waters reaching the stream by direct 
precipitation or rising from springs in the bed or banks of the watercourse.  
Subsurface drainage. Collection and removal of underground water.  
Surface drainage. Collection and removal of water from the surface of the road and the 
ground.  
Surface water. Waters that fall on the land from the skies or arise in springs and diffuse 
themselves over the surface of the ground, following no defined course or channel, and not 
gathering into or forming any more definite body of water than a mere bog or marsh. They 
are lost by being diffused over the ground through percolation, evaporation, or natural 
drainage.  
Toe. (1) The downstream edge at the base of a dam. (2) The line of a fill slope where it 
intersects the natural ground. 
Urban area. An incorporated or unincorporated area that has been developed primarily for 
residential or business purposes.  
Watercourse. A channel in which a flow of water occurs, either continuously or intermit-
tently, and if the latter, with some degree of regularity. Such flow must be in a definite 
direction. Watercourses may be either natural or artificial, and the former may occur either 
on the surface or underground.  
Watershed. Often used as synonymous with drainage basin. The area of land, defined based 
on the topography, that collects and discharges surface runoff past a defined outlet point. In 
a strict sense, the “watershed” is actually the boundary or drainage divide separating one 
drainage basin from another.  
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Wetland. Land that has a predominance of hydric soils (soils that are usually wet and where 
there is little or no free oxygen) and that is inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater 
at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances does 
support, a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation (plants typically found in wet habitats) typi-
cally adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. (20 ILCS 830/1-6) 
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